(Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre)
24/06/2010 - Jennifer Arlen (NYU School of Law)
An Economic Analysis of Corporate Criminal Liability
21/06/2010 - Paolo Pinotti (Bank of Italy)
Migration Restrictions and Criminal Behavior: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
(co-écrit avec Giovanni Mastrobuoni (Collegio Carlo Alberto))
14/06/2010 - Lars Sørgard (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
Optimal Enforcement with Heterogenous Cartels
(co-écrit avec Sissel Jensen)
7/06/2010 - Bertrand Chopard, (BETA et Univ Nancy 2)
(Un)secured Debt and the Likelihood of Court-supervised Reorganization
(co-écrit avec Régis Blazy)
12/04/2010 - Tommaso Nannicini (Univ. Milano-Bocconi)
Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil
(co-écrit avec Fernanda Brollo)
22/03/2010 - Sam Bowles (Santa Fe Institute, University of Sienna and University of Massachusetts)
"The Co-evolution of Technology and Institutions: Agriculture and Private Property"
15/03/2010 - Steffen Huck (UCL)
"Can experiments inform regulators?"
8/03/2010 - Tim Friehe (University of Konstanz)
Too Much R&D Although Polluters Underestimate Environmental Harm?
8/02/2010 - Sylvain Bourjade, (ESC Toulouse)
Expertise and Bias in Decision Making
25/01/2010 - Tomaso Duso (WZB and Humboldt University Berlin)
"Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment"
18/01/2010 - Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE and Université Paris 1)
"The Reliability of the Bertrand Curse: An Experimental Investigation of Leniency Programs for Underground Work"
(avec J-L. Rullière)
14/12/2009 - Cécile Aubert (GRETha, Univ. de Bordeaux 4 et LERNA, Ecole d'Economie de Toulouse)
Managerial effort incentives and market collusion - abstract +/-
We investigate the interactions between managers' incentives to collude or compete, and incentives to exert effort. A manager privately chooses the competitive strategy of the firm, and his own effort to improve productivity; He may substitute collusion to effort to increase profits. High profit targets - i.e., strong effort incentives - make participating in a cartel more attractive. To answer this double moral hazard, owners may have to give the manager information rents, and to choose inefficient effort levels. This affects cartel sustainability and profitability. Because of reduced internal efficiency, welfare losses may arise even when the industry remains competitive. Antitrust policy has a novel value, specifically thanks to individual sanctions: They foster internal efficiency in competing firms while worsening it in cartelized firms. This improves both efficiency under competition and cartel deterrence. Individual fines are thus more beneficial than corporate fines; criminal sanctions are even more effective. Last, individual leniency programs have ambiguous effects, even when not used in equilibrium.
7/12/2009 - Sara Biancini (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries
(avec Emmanuelle Auriol)
23/11/2009 - Francesco Parisi (University of Minnesota)
Forgiving Overconfidence in Tort Law - abstract +/-
Overconfidence is an overestimation of one's own ability that is often associated with an underestimation of risks and inflated estimation of one's future success. Debiasing overconfidence through tort law is not an easy task. If people tend to believe that risks are less likely to materialize for themselves than for others, they inadequately react to legal threats and incentives. For example, overconfidence may lead to the assumption of excessive risks, undermining the deterrent effect of liability rules, even if parties are provided accurate information about statistical facts. In this paper, we build an economic model to consider the role of tort rules in debiasing overconfidence. We show a surprising and counterintuitive implication: the most effective way to correct overconfidence in tort law may be to forgive it, rather than penalize it through liability.
30/11/2009 - Carmine Guerriero (ACLE and University of Amsterdam)
Democracy, Judicial Attitudes and Heterogeneity: the Civil Versus Common Law Tradition - abstract +/-
A key issue in the design of a legal system is the choice of the mechanism aggregating citizens' preferences over the harshness of punishment. While under Case law appellate judges' biases offset one another at the cost of volatility of the law, under Statute law a corruptible Legislator chooses certain rules that are biased only if she favors special interests: i.e., when the preference heterogeneity is sufficiently high and/or the political process sufficiently inefficient. Thus, society should possibly choose Case law only in the last scenario. Instrumental variables estimates based on data from 156 countries, which possibly reformed the transplanted law making institution, con rm this prediction.
12/10/2009 (séance interne) - Ludivine Roussey (EconomiX and Univ. Nanterre)
"The resolution of disputes when parties have psychological motivations"
9/11/2009 (séance interne) - Olivier Musy
The puzzle of legal harmonization
16/11/2009 - Patricia Funk (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
How do Electoral Systems Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence from State and Local Governments, 1890-2005