Unité mixte de recherche 7235

A differential game of intertemporal emissions trading with market power

Julien Chevallier

In international emissions trading schemes such as the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the suboptimal negotiation of the cap with respect to total pollution minimization leads us to critically examine the proposition that generous allocation of grandfathered permits by the regulator based on recent emissions might pave the way for dominant positions. Stemming from this politically given market imperfection, this paper develops a differential Stackelberg game with two types of noncooperative agents: a large potentially dominant agent and a competitive fringe whose size are exogenously determined. The strategic interactions are modelled on an intra-industry permits markets where agents can freely bank and borrow permits. This paper contributes to the debate on initial permits allocation and market power by focusing on the effects of allowing banking and borrowing. A documented appraisal on whether or not such provisions should be included is frequently overlooked by the debate to introduce the permits market itself among other environmental regulation tools. Results are presented under perfect information.

AGENDA

mardi 5 mars 2024

Recherche et Economie et Socioéconomie Politique, des Institutions et des Régulations (RESPIR)

Thomas Angeletti (Université Paris Dauphine PSL & IRISSO CNRS)

L’invention de l’économie française

mardi 5 mars 2024

Webinar TELE – Theoretical European Law & Economics

Ester Manna (University of Barcelona, Spain)

3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)

TBA

mercredi 6 mars 2024

Économies du monde musulman

Amal Briki (Agence Alnaft, Alger)

Les déterminants de la performance bancaire en Algérie

jeudi 7 mars 2024

Doctorants

Michaël Guillossou

Climate Change has Likely Already Affected Yield Growth and Migration: Evidence from the Corn Belt.

mardi 12 mars 2024

Recherche et Economie et Socioéconomie Politique, des Institutions et des Régulations (RESPIR)

Simon Bittmann (CNRS - Université de Strasbourg) et Ulysse Lojkine (Université Paris-Nanterre)

Exploitation: A Socio-Economic Approach

jeudi 14 mars 2024

Lunch

Phu NGUYEN-VAN

TBA

mardi 19 mars 2024

Recherche et Economie et Socioéconomie Politique, des Institutions et des Régulations (RESPIR)

Gilles Rotillon

Les NTIC sauveront-elles le capitalisme?

jeudi 21 mars 2024

Doctorants

Nabil Daher

Is growth really at risk from natural disasters? Evidence from quantile local projections

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