Unité mixte de recherche 7235

Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Lars Sørgard

[en]This paper deals with the enforcement of merger policy, and aims to identify situations where the introduction of remedies can lead to a lower welfare. For this we study how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers, and determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency. We find that when conditional approvals are possible, it may be harder to deter the most welfare-detrimental mergers, and the agency might have to investigate mergers more often. The resulting welfare from merger control can indeed be lower than without remedies.[/en]

AGENDA

mardi 17 mai 2022

Rencontres économiques

9h30 à 11h30

Comment se débarrasser des énergies fossiles et développer les énergies renouvelables dans un monde en crise ?

jeudi 19 mai 2022

Lunch

Christophe Blot

Are all central bank asset purchases the same?

lundi 23 mai 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Clara Jean (Grenoble Ecole de Management)

The Value of Your Data: Privacy and Personal Data Exchange Networks

mardi 24 mai 2022

Recherche et Economie et Socioéconomie Politique, des Institutions et des Régulations (RESPIR)

Alice Sindzingre (CEPN) et Fabrice Tricou

De 13h30 à 15h30

Six forms of hierarchy for a theoretical analysis of capitalism

lundi 30 mai 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Antoine Dubus (ETH Zurich)

Salle G110

Data Driven Mergers and Acquisitions with Information Synergies

mardi 31 mai 2022

Series of Webinars on Economics of Environment, Energy and Transport (SWEEET)

Juan Pablo Montero (PUC)

TBA

jeudi 9 juin 2022

Lunch

Rémi Generoso

TBA

jeudi 9 juin 2022

Groupe de travail « Intelligence artificielle »

Hugo Le Picard (IFRI)

Salle G614B

Le deep learning au service de l’analyse des énergies renouvelables en Afrique

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