Unité mixte de recherche 7235

Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Jean-Philippe Tropeano

[en]The purpose of this paper is to study the relative impact of public and private competition law enforcement on antitrust liability. We develop a model with asymmetric information during trial, where the number of cases filed depends on the amount of damages awarded and on the standard of evidence applied either by the public authority or by the judge. Our model predicts that higher damages result in a higher standard of evidence, which is not always welfare improving. We also show that public enforcement better incentivizes pro-competitive practices by allowing a lower standard of evidence. This may lead the public enforcement to outperform the private enforcement.[/en]

AGENDA

jeudi 19 mai 2022

Lunch

Christophe Blot

Are all central bank asset purchases the same?

lundi 23 mai 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Clara Jean (Grenoble Ecole de Management)

The Value of Your Data: Privacy and Personal Data Exchange Networks

lundi 30 mai 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Antoine Dubus (ETH Zurich)

Salle G110

Data Driven Mergers and Acquisitions with Information Synergies

mardi 31 mai 2022

Series of Webinars on Economics of Environment, Energy and Transport (SWEEET)

Juan Pablo Montero (PUC)

TBA

jeudi 9 juin 2022

Lunch

Rémi Generoso

TBA

jeudi 9 juin 2022

Groupe de travail « Intelligence artificielle »

Hugo Le Picard (IFRI)

Salle G614B

Le deep learning au service de l’analyse des énergies renouvelables en Afrique

mardi 14 juin 2022

Series of Webinars on Economics of Environment, Energy and Transport (SWEEET)

Andrew Plantiga (UCSB)

TBA

mercredi 15 juin 2022

Économies du monde musulman

Amel Bouzid (CREAD, Alger)

Natural and Regulatory Underlying Factors of Food Dependency in Algeria

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