Unité mixte de recherche 7235

On Noncooperative Oligopoly Equilibrium in the Multiple Leader-Follower Game

Ludovic A. Julien

[en]In this paper, we provide new proofs of existence and uniqueness of a Stackelberg market equilibrium for a multiple leader-follower noncooperative oligopoly model in which heterogeneous firms compete on quantities. To this end, we consider a two-step game of perfect and complete information in which many leaders interact strategically with many followers. The Stackelberg market equilibrium constitutes a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. The existence (and uniqueness) problem is complexified in this framework since strategic interactions occur within each partial game but also between both partial games through sequential decisions. Then, to prove existence, we notably provide a new procedure to determine (the conditions under which) the optimal behavior of the followers (may be written) as functions of the leaders’strategy profile only. Some examples outline our procedure and discuss our assumptions.[/en]

AGENDA

jeudi 8 juin 2023

Doctorants

Sahil Chopra (Université Sorbonne Paris-Nord)

Economics of litigation : Securities class action with third-party funding

lundi 12 juin 2023

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Arthur Silve (IAST / Univ. Laval)

TBA

jeudi 15 juin 2023

Lunch

Guillaume Pierné

TBA

lundi 19 juin 2023

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Juan Mora-Sanguinetti (Banco de Espana)

TBA

mardi 20 juin 2023

Colloques et Workshops

Webinar TELE –Theoretical European Law & Economics

mardi 20 juin 2023

When should non-performance of contracts be excused under changed circumstances?

Henrik Lando (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark)

1:30 pm to 2:45 pm (Paris time)

When should non-performance of contracts be excused under changed circumstances?

jeudi 22 juin 2023

Doctorants

Jules Chaperon

TBA

vendredi 1 septembre 2023

Professeurs invités

Ken Yahagi

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