Unité mixte de recherche 7235

Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power

Patricia Charléty, Marie-Cécile Fagart, Saïd Souam

This paper characterizes the equilibria of a costly voting game in which shareholders heterogeneous in both size and preferences strategically vote for or against a proposed resolution or withhold. It is shown that a minimum quorum generates (1) equilibria in which one or several shareholders form voting coalitions in favor of the resolution that is adopted (2) an equilibrium in which shareholders strategically abstain from voting and the resolution is rejected. The size of blockholders and their preferences (in favor or against the resolution) play a crucial role in the existence of equilibria, their nature, the size and the number of voters in coalitions. We derive conditions under which the dominant shareholder controls the meeting. We also examine how large shareholders influence the result of the vote. In particular, we analyze the interaction between blockholders and discuss the situations in which large shareholders jointly control annual meetings or form coalitions to counter the dominant shareholder.

AGENDA

lundi 3 avril 2023

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Stefania Marcassa (CY Cergy)

En salle 614 et en distanciel

Migration, Social Change, and the Early Decline in U.S. Fertility

mardi 4 avril 2023

Recherche et Economie et Socioéconomie Politique, des Institutions et des Régulations (RESPIR)

Franck Bessis (Triangle et Université Lyon 2)

Une ethnographie de l’expertise économique d’Etat

mardi 4 avril 2023

Développement Durable Environnement et Energie (DDEE)

Etienne Lorang (Tilburg University)

Salle 614B de 16h00 – 17h00)

A CGE Integrating Material Stocks and Flows

jeudi 6 avril 2023

Lunch

Axel Gautier (Université de Liège)

The energy community and the grid

mardi 11 avril 2023

Recherche et Economie et Socioéconomie Politique, des Institutions et des Régulations (RESPIR)

Fabrice Dannequin (Université de Reims champagne Ardenne & laboratoire REGARDS)

L’Etat et le capitalisme chez Schumpeter. Un parasite utile ?

jeudi 13 avril 2023

Groupe de travail Economie Comportementale

Claire Mollier

Salle 301-302

Gender, competitiveness, and reaction to defeat

jeudi 13 avril 2023

Doctorants

Pascal Yebarth

Salle G110, 12h-13h

Taxing Market Power in Strategic Bilateral Trade with Quasi-Linear Preferences

vendredi 14 avril 2023

Colloques et Workshops

12th PhD Student Conference in International Macroeconomics

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