Unité mixte de recherche 7235

Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power

Patricia Charléty, Marie-Cécile Fagart, Saïd Souam

This paper characterizes the equilibria of a costly voting game in which shareholders heterogeneous in both size and preferences strategically vote for or against a proposed resolution or withhold. It is shown that a minimum quorum generates (1) equilibria in which one or several shareholders form voting coalitions in favor of the resolution that is adopted (2) an equilibrium in which shareholders strategically abstain from voting and the resolution is rejected. The size of blockholders and their preferences (in favor or against the resolution) play a crucial role in the existence of equilibria, their nature, the size and the number of voters in coalitions. We derive conditions under which the dominant shareholder controls the meeting. We also examine how large shareholders influence the result of the vote. In particular, we analyze the interaction between blockholders and discuss the situations in which large shareholders jointly control annual meetings or form coalitions to counter the dominant shareholder.

AGENDA

mardi 5 décembre 2023

Recherche et Economie et Socioéconomie Politique, des Institutions et des Régulations (RESPIR)

Clément Fontan (UC Louvain)

The ECB and the inflation monsters: strategic framing and the responsibility imperative (1998-2023)

jeudi 7 décembre 2023

Groupe de travail Economie Comportementale

Vincent Lenglin (Université Catholique de Lille)

TBA

jeudi 7 décembre 2023

Doctorants

Emmanuelle Faure

Explaining economic performances in the French employment zone: spatial externalities and related variety

lundi 11 décembre 2023

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Bastien Michel (LEMNA, Nantes)

Measuring the Impact of Incarceration on Recidivism in Denmark

mercredi 13 décembre 2023

Économies du monde musulman

Chahir Zaki (LEO, Université d’Orléans)

Dette en Egypte : conjoncture défavorable ou structure vulnérable ?

jeudi 14 décembre 2023

Lunch

Hugo ORIOLA

Salle 101-102 à 12h

Opportunistic Political Central Bank Coverage: Does media coverage of ECB’s Monetary Policy Impacts German Political Parties’ Popularity?

jeudi 14 décembre 2023

Développement Durable Environnement et Energie (DDEE)

Emeline Bezin (CNRS/CREM)

Salle 101-102

TBA

jeudi 14 décembre 2023

Séminaire Econom’IA

Benjamin Ooghe-Tabanou (médialab - Sciences Po Paris)

Salle G614A de 11h à 12h30

Outils, méthodes et productions numériques à partir de données du web au médialab de Sciences Po

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