Unité mixte de recherche 7235

Tradable deficit permits: a way to ensure sub-national fiscal discipline?

Marie-Laure Breuillé

This paper proposes a system of tradable deficit permits for implementing budgetary austerity at the local level. We evaluate the efficiency of the fiscal retrenchment allocation in a dynamic setting with a commitment problem. The way rights are allcated and traded on the market turns out to be decisive for the cost-effectiveness of the system. Indeed, the inability of the State to commit dynamically to a sharing rule of deficit rights generates perverse incentives which affect the local market. The market turns out to be ineffcient – with heterogeneous jurisdictions – unless the State allows local decision-makers to trade permits through time.

AGENDA

lundi 30 mai 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Antoine Dubus (ETH Zurich)

Salle G110

Data Driven Mergers and Acquisitions with Information Synergies

mardi 31 mai 2022

Series of Webinars on Economics of Environment, Energy and Transport (SWEEET)

Juan Pablo Montero (PUC)

TBA

jeudi 2 juin 2022

Doctorants

Stéphane Matton

Backtesting ESG Ratings

jeudi 9 juin 2022

Lunch

Rémi Generoso

TBA

jeudi 9 juin 2022

Groupe de travail « Intelligence artificielle »

Hugo Le Picard (IFRI)

Salle G614B

Le deep learning au service de l’analyse des énergies renouvelables en Afrique

mardi 14 juin 2022

Series of Webinars on Economics of Environment, Energy and Transport (SWEEET)

Andrew Plantiga (UCSB)

TBA

mercredi 15 juin 2022

Économies du monde musulman

Amel Bouzid (CREAD, Alger)

Natural and Regulatory Underlying Factors of Food Dependency in Algeria

lundi 20 juin 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Wilfried Sand Zantman (ESSEC Business School)

Hitting the Right Target? Pricing and Advertising Strategies in Digital Markets

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