Joint research unit 7235

Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking

Bruno Lovat, Francesco Parisi, Eric Langlais, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock’s rentseeking contests involving two players who differ in strength (marginal returns to effort), motivation (valuations of the sought-after rent) and cunning (bargaining power). We study the combined interaction of these three possible forms of asymmetry in rent-seeking. We examine how these asymmetries affect the rent-seeking contest and investigate the effect of ex post trading opportunities on the players’ efforts, on probabilities of winning and on the social costs of rent-seeking.

AGENDA

Thursday 22 February 2024

Colloques et Workshops

Crises and resilience in developing countries

Monday 26 February 2024

Domino Secessions : Evidence from the US

Jean Lacroix (U Paris Saclay, RITM)

Domino Secessions : Evidence from the US

Monday 26 February 2024

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Jean Lacroix (U Paris Saclay, RITM)

Domino Secessions : Evidence from the US

Tuesday 27 February 2024

Colloques et Workshops

Harcèlement moral et sexuel dans la recherche

Tuesday 27 February 2024

Colloques et Workshops

Harcèlement moral et sexuel dans la recherche

Thursday 29 February 2024

Thomas Jacquet, Amady Léchenet, Albin Salmon, Benjamin Trouvé

Nouveaux Doctorants II

Thomas Jacquet, Amady Léchenet, Albin Salmon, Benjamin Trouvé

Thursday 29 February 2024

Lunch

Nouveaux Doctorants II

Thomas Jacquet, Amady Léchenet, Albin Salmon, Benjamin Trouvé

Thursday 29 February 2024

Playing Dumb to Look Green

Claire Rimbaud (U. Dauphine)

Playing Dumb to Look Green

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