Joint research unit 7235

Commitments in Antitrust

Philippe Choné, Arnold Vialfont, Saïd Souam

Competition agencies have the power to close an antitrust case in return for the commitment to end the alleged infringement. We examine how such a procedure affects deterrence and consumer welfare. We first show that it lowers the deterrent effect of competition policy. However, under asymmetric information, commitments may enhance consumer surplus with shortened proceedings and avoidance of trial type-II errors. The variation of consumer harm w.r.t. the firm’s gain from the practice determines the optimal usage frequency of this negotiation tool. Finally, we show that trial and commitments may be complements as the latter is not always an answer to a lack of efficiency of the agency.

AGENDA

Monday 26 February 2024

Colloques et Workshops

9ème conférence euro-africaine et économie / Mediterranean workshop in economic theory

Monday 26 February 2024

Colloques et Workshops

9ème conférence euro-africaine et économie / Mediterranean workshop in economic theory

Monday 26 February 2024

Domino Secessions : Evidence from the US

Jean Lacroix (U Paris Saclay, RITM)

Domino Secessions : Evidence from the US

Monday 26 February 2024

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Jean Lacroix (U Paris Saclay, RITM)

Domino Secessions : Evidence from the US

Tuesday 27 February 2024

Colloques et Workshops

Harcèlement moral et sexuel dans la recherche

Tuesday 27 February 2024

Colloques et Workshops

Harcèlement moral et sexuel dans la recherche

Thursday 29 February 2024

Thomas Jacquet, Amady Léchenet, Albin Salmon, Benjamin Trouvé

Nouveaux Doctorants II

Thomas Jacquet, Amady Léchenet, Albin Salmon, Benjamin Trouvé

Thursday 29 February 2024

Lunch

Nouveaux Doctorants II

Thomas Jacquet, Amady Léchenet, Albin Salmon, Benjamin Trouvé

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