Joint research unit 7235

Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing

Florian Baumann, Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Maxime Charreire

When it is impossible to identify ex post the producer of a product causing harm or the damage caused is indivisible although caused by multiple injurers, courts must apportion the total damage among tortfeasors. In this model we examine how such liability sharing rules affect the likelhood of tacit collusion. For this we use a standard Cournot oligopoly model where firms are collectively held liable for joint harm inflicted on third parties. The damage caused may be either linear or cumulative in total industry output. With repeated market interaction and grim strategies, we investigate the sustainability of collusion to derive some policy implications.

AGENDA

Monday 23 May 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Clara Jean (Grenoble Ecole de Management)

The Value of Your Data: Privacy and Personal Data Exchange Networks

Monday 23 May 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LINK)

Clara Jean (Grenoble Ecole de Management)

The Value of Your Data: Privacy and Personal Data Exchange Networks

Monday 30 May 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LIEN)

Antoine Dubus (ETH Zurich)

Salle G110

Data Driven Mergers and Acquisitions with Information Synergies

Monday 30 May 2022

Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre (LINK)

Antoine Dubus (ETH Zurich)

Salle G110

Data Driven Mergers and Acquisitions with Information Synergies

Tuesday 31 May 2022

Series of Webinars on Economics of Environment, Energy and Transport (SWEEET)

Juan Pablo Montero (PUC)

TBA

Tuesday 31 May 2022

Series of Webinars on Economics of Environment, Energy and Transport (SWEEET)

Juan Pablo Montero (PUC)

TBA

Thursday 9 June 2022

Lunch

Rémi Generoso

TBA

Thursday 9 June 2022

Lunch

Rémi Generoso

TBA

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