Joint research unit 7235

Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties

Thomas Cortade, Eric Langlais, Bertrand Chopard

Parties engaged in a litigation generally enter the discovery process with different informations regarding their case and/or an unequal endowment in terms of skill and ability to produce evidence and predict the outcome of a trial. Hence, they have to bear different legal costs to assess the (equilibrium) plaintiff’s win rate. The paper analyses pretrial negotiations and revisits the selection hypothesis in the case where these legal expenditures are private information. This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence (Osborne, 1999). Two alternative situations are investigated, depending on whether there exists a unilateral or a bilateral informational asymmetry. Our general result is that efficient pretrial negotiations select cases with the smallest legal expenditures as those going to trial, while cases with largest costs prefer to settle. Under the one-sided asymmetric information assumption, we find that the American rule yields more trials and higher aggregate legal expenditures than the French and British rules. The two-sided case leads to a higher rate of trials, but in contrast provides less clear-cut predictions regarding the influence of fee-shifting.

AGENDA

Tuesday 7 February 2023

Recherche et Economie et Socioéconomie Politique, des Institutions et des Régulations (RESPIR)

Tristan Velardo (Sciences Po Bordeaux, Centre Emile Durkheim)

Report à une date ultérieure qui sera communiquée dès que possible

From the primitive mentality to the civilization of capitalism: Schumpeter, reader of Lévy-Bruh

Tuesday 7 February 2023

From the primitive mentality to the civilization of capitalism: Schumpeter, reader of Lévy-Bruh

Tristan Velardo (Sciences Po Bordeaux, Centre Emile Durkheim)

Report à une date ultérieure qui sera communiquée dès que possible

From the primitive mentality to the civilization of capitalism: Schumpeter, reader of Lévy-Bruh

Tuesday 7 February 2023

Flood Risk Information: Evidence from Paris Housing Markets

Emmanuelle Lavaine (CEE-M - University of Montpellier)

Flood Risk Information: Evidence from Paris Housing Markets

Tuesday 7 February 2023

Développement Durable Environnement et Energie (DDEE)

Emmanuelle Lavaine (CEE-M - University of Montpellier)

Flood Risk Information: Evidence from Paris Housing Markets

Thursday 9 February 2023

Gender, competitiveness, and reaction to defeat

Claire Mollier

Gender, competitiveness, and reaction to defeat

Thursday 9 February 2023

Doctorants

Claire Mollier

Gender, competitiveness, and reaction to defeat

Friday 10 February 2023

Colloques et Workshops

Digital Economics Workshop

Friday 10 February 2023

Colloques et Workshops

Digital Economics Workshop

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