Photo Maxime Charreire

Maxime Charreire

Doctorant(e)
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  • Tél. professionnel 0140975906
  • Bureau à Paris Nanterre (Bât. + num.) G309
  • Research group

      Droit, Institutions, Règlementation et Interactions Stratégiques

2020-25 "Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability ?"

Maxime Charreire, Eric Langlais

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Abstract
This paper considers an oligopoly where firms produce a joint and indivisible environmental harm as a by-product of their output. We first analyze the effects on the oligopoly equilibrium of alternative designs in environmental liability law, secondly, we discuss the rationale for "non-conventional" competition policies, i.e. more concerned with public interest such as the preservation of human health or environment. We study firms decisions of care and output under various liability regimes (strict liability vs negligence) associated with alternative damages apportionment rules (per capita vs market share rule), and with damages multipliers. We find that basing an environmental liability law on the combination of strict liability, the per capita rule, and an "optimal" damages multiplier, is consistent with a conservative competition policy, focused on consumers surplus, since, weakening firms' market power also increases aggregate expenditures in environment preservation and social welfare. In contrast, a shift to the market share rule, or to a negligence regime, may be consistent with a restriction of competition, since firms' entry may instead lead to a decrease in aggregate environmental expenditures and losses of social welfare. Nevertheless the fine tuning of the policy requires specific information from a Competition Authority, which we discuss as well.
Classification-JEL
L41, L13, K13
Mot(s) clé(s)
Strict liability; negligence; damages apportionment rules; market share liability; environmental liability; Cournot oligopoly; competition policy.
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2019-21 "Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing"

Florian Baumann, Maxime Charreire, Andreea Cosnita-Langlais

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Abstract
When it is impossible to identify ex post the producer of a product causing harm or the damage caused is indivisible although caused by multiple injurers, courts must apportion the total damage among tortfeasors. In this model we examine how such liability sharing rules affect the likelhood of tacit collusion. For this we use a standard Cournot oligopoly model where firms are collectively held liable for joint harm inflicted on third parties. The damage caused may be either linear or cumulative in total industry output. With repeated market interaction and grim strategies, we investigate the sustainability of collusion to derive some policy implications.
Classification-JEL
L41, L13, K13
Mot(s) clé(s)
Cournot oligopoly, liability sharing rules, market collusion
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