Photo Pierre-André Jouvet

Pierre-André Jouvet

Professeur(e)
  • Email
  • Tél. professionnel 0140975966
  • Bureau à Paris Nanterre (Bât. + num.) G313F
  • Research group

      Développement Durable, Environnement et Energie

  • Theme(s)
    • Marchés de permis d'émission
    • Environnement et politiques publiques
    • Transition énergétique
    • Dynamique de croissance

2008-28 "The Spaceship Problem Re-Examined"

Pierre-André Jouvet, Pierre Pestieau, Grégory Ponthière

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Abstract
This paper re-examines the spaceship problem, i.e. the design of the optimal population under the environmental constraint of a fixed area available for life, by focusing on the dilemma between adding new beings and extending the life of existing beings. For that purpose, we characterize, under the assumption that individual lifetime welfare depends positively on the length of life but negatively on population density, the preference ordering of a utilitarian planner over lifetime-equal histories, i.e. pairs of initial population size and survival conditions yielding an equal number of life periods. It is shown that a Benthamite planner is not necessarily indifferent between lifetime-equal histories, and that a Millian utilitarian planner prefers lifetime-equal histories yielding the smallest population with the longest life. The solutions under Critical-level and Number-dampened utilitarianisms are also shown to differ significantly.
Classification-JEL
D63, Q56, Q57
Mot(s) clé(s)
environmental congestion, fertility, longevity, population ethics, utilitarianism
File

2008-25 "Bankable Pollution Permits under Uncertainty and Optimal Risk Management Rules: Theory and Empirical Evidence"

Julien Chevallier, Johanna Etner, Pierre-André Jouvet

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Abstract
The well known economic advantage of tradable permits over command
and control obviously vanishes if firms do not trade because of regulatory
uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty about political decision changes in the permits
program could make firms reluctant to participate in tradable permits
markets. Based on a two-period partial equilibrium framework, our results
suggest that the banking provisions may be used as a tool of policy risk control
and that it is possible to define optimal risk sharing rules in order to
respond to political decision changes. Finally, our empirical discussion attempts
to put the theoretical results concerning firms' banking and pooling
behaviors in the context of the recent development of the European Union
Emisions Trading scheme (EU ETS).
Classification-JEL
D21, D80, Q58
Mot(s) clé(s)
Firm behavior; Tradable permits; Policy risk; EU ETS
File

2007-31 "Public and private environmental spending.A political economy approach"

Pierre-André Jouvet, Philippe Michel, Pierre Pestieau

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Abstract
This paper studies the determination of public investment in environmental
quality when there are private alternatives. Public investment is chosen by
majority voting. When consumption and environmental quality are
complementary one may observe a solution of the type "ends against the
middle."
Classification-JEL
Mot(s) clé(s)
File

2007-19 "Longevity and environmental quality in an OLG model"

Pierre-André Jouvet, Pierre Pestieau, Grégory Ponthière

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Abstract
Whereas existing OLG models with endogenous longevity neglect
the impact of environmental quality on mortality, this paper studies
the design of the optimal public intervention in a two-period OLG
model where longevity is influenced positively by health expenditures,
but negatively by pollution due to production. It is shown that if
individuals, when choosing how much to spend on health, do not internalize
the impact of their decision on environmental quality (i.e.
the space available for each person), the decentralization of the social
optimum requires a tax not only on capital income, but also, on
health expenditures. The sensitivity of the optimal second-best public
intervention is also explored numerically.
Classification-JEL
Mot(s) clé(s)
File

2007-15 "A note the cost of pollution abatement"

Thierry Bréchet, Pierre-André Jouvet

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Abstract
We show that the common assumption that innovation reduces
the marginal abatement cost is wrong. We draw some implications
about the incentives to innovate under environmental regulation. In
particular, we find that adopting an environmental friendly technology
may lead to more pollution and less profit at the firm level.
Classification-JEL
H23, L51
Mot(s) clé(s)
innovation, pollution abatement cost, production function, environmental regulation
File

2006-21 "Permis de pollution et contraintes politiques dans un modèle à générations imbriquées"

Pierre-André Jouvet, Fabien Prieur

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Abstract
We develop an overlapping generations model of growth in which production generates polluting harmful emissions. In order to control pollution, the government implements an emission permits system. However, subject to political constraints, it is not able to assign the optimal quota on emissions. Hence, in such a framework, regulating pollution solely by permits does not allow the decentralized economy to achieve the long run social optimum. Our contribution is then to show that the combination of the existing permits system with a policy intended to promote a price discrimination between agents on the permits market, is a mean not only to circumvent these rigidities but also to restore the Pareto optimality of the equilibrium.
Classification-JEL
D91, Q28, H23
Mot(s) clé(s)
File

2006-12 "Why environmental regulation may lead to no-regret pollution abatement?"

Thierry Bréchet, Pierre-André Jouvet

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Abstract
Empirical evidence support the existence of pollution abatement possibilities at negative costs, the so-called 'no-regret options'. We provide a microeconomic rationale for the existence of such potential at the firm's level under environmental regulation. An econometric application confirms that marginal pollution abatement cost curves with no-regret options are compatible with a standard production function, as stated in our theoretical model.
Classification-JEL
D20; Q50
Mot(s) clé(s)
No-regret options, pollution, regulation
File

2006-7 "Stockage des permis de pollution en incertitude et règle de partage optimal de risques"

Johanna Etner, Pierre-André Jouvet

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Abstract
The well known economic advantage of tradable permits over command and control obviously vanish if firms do not trade because of policy uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty about changes in the permits program could make firms reluctant to invest in tradable permits. This article proposes to give optimal risk sharing rules in order to respond to policy risk. We show how banking of tradable permits can be used as a tool of policy risk control.
Classification-JEL
D21, D80, Q58
Mot(s) clé(s)
firm behavior, tradable permits, policy risk
File

2006-1 "Optimal growth in overlapping generations with a directly polluting sector and an indirect one"

Pierre-André Jouvet, Philippe Michel, Gilles Rotillon

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Abstract
We study the optimal growth path and its decentralization in an overlapping generations model with two consumption goods and pollution effect. We consider two production sector i.e. one with a direct effect of pollution and the other with an indirect pollution effect by using energy. In the presence of externalities, decentralization of an optimal path needs some specific taxes in addition to lump-sum transfers. The introduction of a market for pollution permits, concerning only the polluting sector, neutralizes the external environmental effects. We show that there is a unique management of permits such that the equilibrium coincides with the optimal path: all permits should be auctioned i.e. no free permits to firms. This conclusion is in contradiction with the usual practice of grandfathering.
Classification-JEL
D61, D9, Q28
Mot(s) clé(s)
optimal growth, environment, market of permits
File
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