On the deterrent effect of individual versus collective liability in criminal organizations
Journal of Advanced Research in Law & Economics
Autres
2
2011
Laeticia Hauret, Carine Sonntag, Eric Langlais
L’article étudie la politique optimale de lutte contre le crime organisé, et plus spécifiquement, la répartition des sanctions pénales entre le leader et les exécutants.
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