Co-auteur: Ludovic Julien.
Discutants: Rémi Oddou (sénior) et Ben Vieira Kouassi (junior)

Abstract: In this note, we investigate the effectiveness and the optimality of fiscal policies in the strategic bilateral exchange framework of Gabszewicz and Grazzini (JPET, 1999). We notably propose to test the robustness of the following result: endowment taxation with transfers can implement a first-best allocation in Cobb-Douglas, linear and CES strategic bilateral trade. Through an example in which the preferences of traders are represented by quasi-linear utility functions, we show that endowment taxation with transfers implements a Pareto-optimal allocation, while taxation without transfer does not. Indeed, the optimality of endowment taxation with transfers is robust for a larger class of utility functions, including the quasi-linear utility function, which is often used to represent the preferences of agents in public economics.