Robert Bliss
Calloway School of Business and Accountancy
Wake Forest University
Professeur Invité à l’Université de Paris X
Cette présentation traitera des arguments justifiant la discipline de marché, des propositions pour intégrer la discipline de marché dans la supervision et des raisons pour lesquelles la discipline de marché est moins efficace que ce que suppose la théorie. C’est un peu l’état de l’art sur la question qu’il propose. Références
- Bliss, Robert R., 2001, “Market Discipline and Subordinated Debt: A Review of Some Salient Issues”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, First Quarter, 24–45.
- Bliss, Robert R. and Mark J. Flannery, 2002, “Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influence”, European Finance Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, 361–395.
- Bliss, Robert R., 2004, “Market Discipline: Players, Processes, and Purposes” in Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries, ed. W. Hunter, G. Kaufman, C. Borio, and K. Tsatsaronis, MIT Press, Boston, 37–53.
(Workshop faillite)
Jeudi 22 novembre 2007 10h30 – 12h 30, salle des colloques du bâtiment K Derivatives are Special: Law and Market Mechanisms Références
- Bliss, Robert R. and George G. Kaufman, 2006, “Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout,” Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 2, No. 1, April, 55–70.
- Bliss, Robert R. and Chryssa Papathanassiou, 2007, “Derivatives Clearing, Central Counter Parties, and Systemic Risk,” working paper, Wake Forest University.
(Séminaire EconomiX)