Résumé : We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Compared to neutral settings, skepticism is significantly lower when it is self-threatening, and not enhanced when it is self-serving. These results shed light on a new channel that individuals can use to protect their beliefs in communication situation: they exercise skepticism in a motivated way, that is, in a way that depends on the desirability of the conclusions that skeptical inferences lead to.

Co-auteurs : Vincent Lenglin (Anthropo-Lab, Université Catholique de Lille), Joel Santos (IESEG, EDHEC)

Co auteurs : Loukas Balafoutas et Brit Grosskopf (University of Exeter, United Kingdom)

en collaboration avec Sofiia Mun (Paris School of Economics)

en collaboration avec Vincent Teixeira

co-écrit avec Pierre Fleckinger et Christian Waibel.

écrit en collaboration avec Arthur Attema, Jocelyn Raude, Valérie Seror, The COCONEL Group

co-écrit avec Loukas Balafoutas, Mehdi Feizi, et Björn Vollan.

co-écrit avec Noémi Berlin

co-écrit avec Johanna Etner et Meglena Jeleva

co-écrit avec Patrick Roger et Marc Willinger

co-écrit avec B. Ouvrard, A. Reynaud et L.Tuffery

co-écrit avec Raphael Soubeyran et Nicolas Querou

Co-écrit avec Fabienne Llense et Jekaterina Dmitrijeva

Price discrimination based on consumers' personal data has become common practice in many markets. We analyze the willingness to share personal data when this data is used for pricing in subsequent markets. In a laboratory experiment, participants can sell a bundle of personal data. Participants are categorized based on the content of their personal data and receive category-dependent payoffs in a subsequent stage. The experimental variations change category-dependent the payoff structure. We find no effect of subsequent price discrimination on the general willingness to sell personal data. A significant change in the price of personal data is only observed under strong negative price discrimination. Furthermore, we find important gender differences in data selling price adjustments and the role of underlying privacy concerns.

co-écrit avec Lydia Ashton (University of Wisconsin-Madison. Wisconsin Institute for Discovery) et Emmanuel Kemel (HEC Business School Paris & GREGHEC, CNRS)

Classic economic theory focuses on static and stable preferences. However, there is growing evidence that cognitive, emotional and visceral states (e.g. stress, hunger) can mediate behavioral biases and shape preferences (DellaVigna, 2009). In particular, Symmonds & al. (2010) and Levy & al. (2013) provide evidence that risk attitudes fluctuate with metabolic states. In this paper, we follow this stream of research and propose an experimental design with a specific hunger manipulation mechanism and an original risk attitude elicitation tool that allows parametric estimation of the components of Prospect Theory (PT) by using a convex budget line (CBL) allocation methodology (Choi & al., 2007).

Participants (N=107, Xlab Berkeley) were required to fast for at least three hours before the experiment and completed a high-protein shake tasting activity before/after (randomly assigned) the risk attitude elicitation questionnaire. Our results suggest a limited impact of hunger on the utility function and loss aversion parameters. However, we find that hungry (fasting) participants display significantly more risk aversion (curvature of the utility function) and probability distortion (inverse S shape of the probability weighting function) than the satiated participants. These results are consistent with and extend the existing empirical evidence on satiation and risk attitudes and feed the debate on the impact of hunger on economic decision

co-écrit avec Pierpaolo Battigalli (Bocconi University and IGIER, Milan) & Rosemarie Nagel (ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE)

- de 10h00 à 11h00

Marie Pierre Dargnies (Université Paris Dauphine) présentera un protocole expérimental sur le thème :

"Speed and information in financial trading: Experimental design"

- de 11h00 à 12h15

Léontine Goldzahl (Edhec Business School) présentera un article intitule:

"Health Insurance decision: a theoretical and experimental investigation"

avec David Crainich (CNRS, IESEF School of Management), , Florence Jusot (Université Paris Dauphine, PSL), Doriane Mignon (Université Paris Dauphine, PSL)

Béatrice Boulu-Reshef, Graciela Kuechle, Luise Rohland

Entrepreneurs may differentiate their ventures and attract investments by advertising that their firm produces positive externalities for society. Such signaling of entrepreneurs’ trustworthiness may be a prevalent practice in these investment opportunities which are casually referred to as “impact investment’’ by practitioners. This paper investigates this possible signaling by studying the interplay of altruistic, fiscal, and reputational motives that characterizes these investments in a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, the investor may transfer money to the entrepreneur, who may then invest some, all or none of this money onto a conventional investment opportunity or an impact investment opportunity involving a spillover, and then decide whether or not to transfer some of the funds back. Entrepreneurs choose a type of investment and their choice is visible to the investors. The results are that the choice alone of an impact project does not increase investors’ transfers to impact investments but a higher spillover does as long as the tax from possible gains is not too high. Pro-social entrepreneurs do not announce higher rates of spillovers. In the presence of tax, entrepreneurs internalize that a too high spillover could scare away investors. The experiment shows that the presence of impact investments helps investors coordinate onto different investment types. It identifies the mechanisms behind investors believing that socially-oriented entrepreneurs will be more trustworthy. Specifically, as investors’ transfers react to the effective societal impact and not to the mere project type, making that quantitative information visible allows investors to differentiate between investment opportunities.

We investigate the role of preferences for risk on health and sexual behaviours of 805 female sex workers in Senegal, of whom 441 were surveyed twice at a two-year interval. Risk preferences were measured using simple incentivised risk elicitation tasks as well as domain specific risk-taking scales. We find that the experimental measure was poorly correlated with self-reported measures. We further find that risk preferences were highly stable across domains and fairly stable over time. Our main result indicates that risk preferences measured in the lab are a main predictor of sex workers' health and behaviours. We find that risk averse sex workers demand more preventive services and are less likely to engage in risky sex and, as a result, are less likely to be infected with sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS. Hence, our results conrm the role of risk preferences in the spread of HIV/AIDS epidemic.

En collaboration avec D.A. Regier et V. Watson

Co-écrit avec MA Diaye et S. Pekovic