Significant progresses have been made in the understanding of the building of institutional frameworks, and in the analysis of the impact of institutions on economic performances.  Despite developments in institutional economics, in law and economics and in political economy, there is however a lack of integration of the knowledge necessary to design and run institutional policies aimed at building relevant and efficient frameworks for markets.

Contemporary economics made major progresses in departing from the traditional vision of the discipline in which institutions were exogenous in the analysis, and most of the time given. However, the dominant vision today is still a “mechanical” one. Market institutions are seen as turnkey tools available on the shelves. It is often assumed that a given institutional tool should produce a given economic outcome, with little understanding of implementation constraints and interplay between various tools. More “biologic” visions remain also too crude. Evolutions are too often seen though the lenses of efficient processes of selection of the fittest, and of cumulative learning. In the same time, analyses at the frontier of other disciplines (in particular law and political science) have been highlighting the various logics are at play in the dynamic of institutions. In a nutshell, economic institutions result from the interplay among the economic quest for efficiency, the political fights for strength and rewarding positions, and the legal constraints of security and stability.

It seems therefore relevant to build a framework to analyze the interplay between the economy, the politic and the law.
At least three “levels” of analysis could be relevant to understand the process of market manufacturing. The first one is the one of “markets rights” by which economic agents can access to resources, use them and trade through the combination of “property rights”, “market design” and “market regulations”. Above this level, the “governance” one is the one at which “market rights” are implemented through negotiation and strategic games among various kind of economic, politic and social actors. The third level of analysis correspond to the “Institutional foundations” that set-up the basic rules according to which the “governance” game is played.

Six categories of actors play a fundamental role in these games. The economic arena is structured by the conflicting interests of the users (both consumers and professional users), of the innovators (innovative firms and new entrants) and of the incumbents. The institutional arena is structured by a conflict of logics between policy makers (with a dichotomy between the executive branch and the parliament), the judiciary, and the “market authorities” (i.e. the regulators and the competition authorities, which are characterized by different levels of discretionary and rule making power).
The complexity draws from the fact that all these actors play simultaneously on the three levels, while they do not necessarily rely on the same logic in each arena.

The goal of the workshop is to take stock of the knowledge accumulated over the past years, both about the strategic reactions and games played around regulatory reforms, and about the interplay between political competition, economic life and the law. Contributors will propose synthesis and new developments aimed at contributing to the design of a renewed tool-kit and guidelines for market policies. It will necessitate analytical advances on the governance of markets. Four lines of analysis shall be developed

1. Most of the market manufacturing interactions described above are driven by interacting logics, namely efficiency, collective interest, stability and security, and rent seeking. It is worth to better understand the factors leading one of these logics to be dominant in various contexts (i.e. different combinations of actors at various levels of institutional design).
2. The dynamic of market manufacturing comes both from top-down movement of institutional reforms and from bottom-up streams of institutional innovation. It is essential to deepen our knowledge on the interplay between these complementary logics of change.
3. In the course of market manufacturing, strategies are unstable because the various players learn (both the outcome of a given governance regime and the dynamic of given process of change). It is important, especially to drive reforms, to learn how to benefit from this accumulation of knowledge, and to take into consideration the evolving capabilities of actors.

On the one hand, institutions framing markets are characterized by stability because many feedback loops tend to maintain existing equilibrium. On the other hand, these institutions can be understood as simultaneous equilibra among various games played in interdependent spheres (in the spirit of Aoki), which can be entirely destabilized by an “external” shock. Getting a better understanding of the dialectic between stability (at least, path dependency) and risks of systemic crisis is essential both to understand the strong constraints framing any policy of market manufacturing, and to identify opportunities and paths of reform.

12h30 – 13h45 Welcome lunch

13h45 – 14h00
Opening of the workshop and words of welcome by:
Eric Brousseau (University of Paris Ouest) and Jean Michel Glachant (EUI & University of Paris XI)

Afternoon session: 14h00-18h15

Chair: Stefano Bartolini (European University Institute)

14h00 – 14h45: Jérôme Sgard (CERI/Sciences-Po)
“Hyperinflation and the evolution of monetary institutions: Argentina and Brazil, 1990-2002”
Discussants: Céline Bignebat (INRA) and Witold Henisz (The Wharton School)

14h45 – 15h30: Craig Pirrong (University of Houston)
“Exchanges: The Quintessential Manufactured Markets”
Discussants: Laure Athias (IDHEAP / University of Lausanne) and Victor Nee (Cornell University)

15h30 – 16h00: Coffee break

16h00 – 16h45: Mark Thatcher (London School of Economics and Political Science - LSE)
“The dynamic of regulatory norms in the EU: a political perspective”
Discussants: Adrienne Héritier (European University Institute) and Ashish Velkar (London School of Economics)

16h45 – 17h30: Victor Nee (Cornell University) and Sonja Opper (Lund University)
“Markets for Innovation in China”
Discussants: Maria Alessandra Rossi (University of Siena) and Jérôme Sgard (CERI/Sciences-Po)

17h30 – 18h15: Michel Aglietta (University of Paris Ouest) and Laurence Scialom (University of Paris Ouest)
“A systemic approach in financial regulation – A European perspective”
Discussants: Claudine Desrieux (University of Paris I) and Ivan Diaz (European University Institute)

19h00 –19h 45: Concert

20h00: Dinner

Morning session: 9h00-13h15

Chair: Adrienne Héritier (European University Institute)

9h00 – 9h45: John Joseph Wallis (University of Maryland and NBER)
“Why Competitive Markets Aren’t Self-Actuating: The Political Economy of Open Access”
Discussants: Yannick Perez (EUI & University of Paris XI) and Larry Neal (University of Illinois)

9h45 – 10h30: Terry L. Anderson, (Montana State University) and Gary Libecap (University of California, Santa Barbara)
“The Allocation and Dissipation of Resource Rents: Implications for Fishery Reform”
Discussants: Raphaël Soubeyran (INRA) and Tom Dederwaerdere (Université Catholique de Louvain)

10h30 – 11h00: Coffee break

11h00 – 11h45: Benito Arrunada (Pompeu Fabra University)
“Building Market Institutions”
Discussants: Eshien Chong (University of Paris XI) and John Joseph Wallis (University of Maryland)

11h45 – 12h30: Denny Ellerman (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
“Air Emission Markets”
Discussants: Freddy Huet (University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis) and Gary Libecap (University of California, Santa Barbara)

12h30 – 13h15: Per M. Stromberg (University of Cambridge), Tom Dederwaerdere (Université Catholique de Louvain) and Unai Pascual (University of Cambridge)
“Ex situ collections in microbial research: The contribution of public networks to knowledge accumulation”
Discussants: Sophie Harnay (University of Paris Ouest) and Denny Ellerman (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

13h15 – 14h30: Lunch break

Afternoon session: 14h30-18h00

Chair: Yannick Perez (EUI & University of Paris XI)

14h30 – 15h15: Aashish Velkar (London School of Economics)
“Measurement Systems as Market Foundations: The role of mensuration in generating economic knowledge”
Discussants: Eric Brousseau (University of Paris Ouest) and Manuel Gonzales-Diaz (Universidad de Oviedo)

15h15 – 16h00: Marta Fernández-Barcala (Universidad de Oviedo), Manuel González-Díaz (Universidad de Oviedo) and Emmanuel Raynaud (INRA)
“The Governance of Quality: The Case of Fresh Meat”
Discussants: Jean-François Sattin (IAE - Valenciennes) and Céline Bignebat (INRA)

16h00 – 16h30: Coffee break

16h30 – 17h15: Antonio Manganelli (University of Siena),  Antonio Nicita (University of Siena) and Maria Alessandra Rossi (University of Siena)
“Multilevel competition policy in Europe”
Discussants: Laurence Scialom (University of Paris Ouest) and Laure Athias (IDHEAP / University of Lausanne)

17h15 – 18h00: Howard Shelanski (University of California, Berkeley)
“American vs European logic in competition policy”
Discussants: Adrien de Hauteclocque (University of Manchester) and Antonio Nicita (University of Siena)

20h00: Gala Dinner

Morning session: 9h00-13h15

Chair: Eric Brousseau (University of Paris Ouest)

9h00 – 9h45: Witold Henisz (The Wharton School)
“Embedded Neoliberalism: Replacing the False Prophets of Homo Economicus with Homo Therian”
Discussants: Freddy Huet (University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis) and Benito Arrunada (Pompeu Fabra University)

9h45 – 10h30: Larry Neal (University of Illinois)
“The Microstructure of the First Emerging Markets in Europe in the 18th Century”
Discussants: Sophie Harnay (University of Paris Ouest) and Stephen  Littlechild (Judge Business School, U. of Cambridge)

10h30 – 11h00: Coffee break

11h00 – 11h45: Adrienne Héritier (European University Institute) and Yannis Karagiannis (IBEI Barcelona)
“Intercontinental regulation of civil aviation : Bargaining and Implementing the Open Skies Agreement” - slides
Discussants: Anne Yvrande-Billon (CAE and University of Paris I) and Leigh Hancher (Tilburg University)
 
11h45 – 12h30: Leigh Hancher (Tilburg University)
“Are the foundations of (EU-energy) market driven by regulation or competition policy?”
Discussants: Adrien de Hauteclocque (University of Manchester) and Howard Shelanski (University of California, Berkeley)

12h30 – 13h30: Lunch break

Afternoon session: 13h30-17h00

Chair: Jean Michel Glachant (EUI & University of Paris XI)

13h30 – 14h15: Stephen  Littlechild (University of Birmingham and University of Cambridge)
“The creation of a market for retail electricity supply”
Discussants: Carine Staropoli (University of Paris I) and Victor Nee (Cornell University)

14h15 – 15h00: Eshien Chong (University of Paris XI), Carine Staropoli (University of Paris I) and Anne Yvrande-Billon (CAE and University of Paris I)
“Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for New Empirical Evidence”
Discussants: Leonardo Meeus (Leuven University & EUI) and Frank A Wolak (Stanford University)

15h00 – 15h30: Coffee break

15h30 – 16h15: Shaun D. McRae (Stanford University) and Frank A Wolak (Stanford University)
“How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? Evidence from a Bid-Based Wholesale Electricity Market”
Discussants: Marcelo Saguan (European University Institute) and Craig Pirrong (University of Houston)

16h30: Conclusion of the workshop