Photo Anicet Kabre

ANICET KABRE

CHARGÉ(E) DE RECHERCHES

Research interests

  • arrow_right Interactions stratégiques et équilibre général
  • arrow_right Théorie des défauts de coordination
  • arrow_right Economie de l'environnement
  • arrow_right Externalités et politiques publiques

Research group

    Comportements, Droits et Bien-être

Contact

HAL

2023-14

Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?

Ludovic A. Julien, Anicet Kabre, Louis de Mesnard

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Abstract
We introduce polluting emissions in a sequential noncooperative oligopoly model of bilateral exchange. In one sector a leader and a follower use polluting technologies which create negative externalities on the payoffs of strategic traders who belong to the other sector. By modeling emissions as a negative externality, we show that the leader pollutes more (less) than the follower when strategies are substitutes (complements). Then, we consider the implementation of public policies to control the levels of emissions, namely two taxation mechanisms and a permit market. We study the effects of these public policies. Moreover, we determine the conditions under which these public policies can implement a Pareto-improving allocation.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Stackelberg competition; pollution; fiscal policy; permit market
2018-48

Cobb-Douglas preferences and pollution in a bilateral oligopoly market

Anicet Kabre

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Abstract
In this note, we introduce pollution and examine its effects in a finite bilateral oligopoly model where agents have asymmetric Cobb-Douglas preferences. We define two strategic equilibria: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium with pollution (SCEP) and the Cournot equilibrium with pollution (CEP). While the supplied quantities of the polluting and the non-polluting good depend on the preferences of all economic agents in the case of symmetric preferences, we show that when preferences are asymmetric, i) at both equilibria, each polluter’s equilibrium supply depends only on the non-polluters’ preferences for the non-polluting good; ii) at the CEP and the SCEP, the elasticity of the polluters emissions is greater when nonpolluters preferences for the non-polluting good increase, compared to an increase in their own preferences for this good; iii) firm’s emissions’elasticity decreases with the market power if their marginal cost is lower than their competitor.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Bilateral oligopoly; Pollution; Cobb-Douglas preferences
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