Photo Fabrice Tricou

Fabrice Tricou

Maître de conférences avec HDR
  • Email
  • Tél. professionnel 0140977356
  • Bureau à Paris Nanterre (Bât. + num.) G611A
  • Research group

      Macroéconomie Internationale, Banque et Econométrie Financière

  • Theme(s)
    • Coordination marchande
    • Philosophie économique
    • Théorie des jeux
    • Histoire de la pensée économique

2014-40 "A post-Paretian concept of optimality: the “Conditional Agreement Point”"

Fabrice Tricou

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Abstract
This paper introduces and develops the concept of “conditional agreement point”,defined as the dominating issue (hard optimality) within a certain restricted subset of the set of feasible issues (partial optimality). Such a concept associates individualistic independence (via the operation of individual preferences) and humanistic autonomy (via the social choice of the determined subset). As the “conditional agreement point” assumes a dualistic conception of human beings as self-interest followers and as rule makers, it acknowledges mixed or complex types of behavior and it supports some syntheses between efficiency and justice. Precisely, the notion of CAP permits the reconsideration of classical coordination or cooperation problems such as the bilateral exchange.
Classification-JEL
D60, D63, D50, C70.
Mot(s) clé(s)
efficiency and justice; independence and autonomy; bilateral exchange.
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2012-50 "Les extensions contextuelles et structurelles du choix économique rationnel"

Fabrice Tricou

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Abstract
Rational choice theory stretches out in two complementary directions. Its contextual and extensive application fills and then overflows the strict domain of substantive economy, eventually identifying any human choice with an economic decision. Its structural and intensive sophistication surpasses the basic framework of choice without uncertainty to treat the exogenous and endogenous forms of uncertainty. These two forms of progress, thematic and analytical, come together to ensure the general expansion of the field of rational choice. Beyond its advantages and achievements, this attempt at universal “economization” faces limits in the two directions of its development. Contextually, the logic of instrumental choice is unable to grasp deontological morals and axiological rationality. And structurally, the logistics of rational choice is inoperative faced with a radically uncertain environment and/or a one-on-one interaction with another person.
Classification-JEL
B40, D01, D80, C70
Mot(s) clé(s)
rational choice theory, economics, interest, morals, uncertainty, market
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2011-30 "Count, trade, venture and desire: why money is at the core of decentralized economies"

Fabrice Tricou

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Abstract
This paper defends two related ideas: pure market and capitalist economies are different economic societies; neither can be adequately represented by theories of value but both can be accurately distinguished by a monetary approach. Within the framework of a simple modeling, we propose a conceptual clarification in four points. Firstly, market and capitalist economies are instituted by a principle of social quantification: money as the unit of account. Secondly, both economies are set in motion by a medium of circulation: money as the general equivalent. Thirdly, pure market society homogeneity is based on generalized access to money as the vehicle of autonomous expense (the carrier of unilateral action), while capitalist society heterogeneity is based on direct access to money reserved only to entrepreneurs and closed to monetarily dependent wage earners. Fourthly, if independent workers (integrated in a social division of labor) can be seen as motivated by the individual pursuit of utility, capitalists (engaged in an objective logic of capital accumulation) are driven by the subjective desire for money.
Classification-JEL
B00, D51, E42, P00
Mot(s) clé(s)
money, market, capitalism
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2008-29 "Market Price Mechanisms and Stackelberg General Equilibria"

Ludovic A. Julien, Fabrice Tricou

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Abstract
This paper considers Stackelberg competition in a general equilibrium framework with production. The working of market power and the confi...gurations of strategic interactions are complexi...ed by the presence of an active leader. Two market price mechanisms are here studied: one is associated with the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium, the other is linked to the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium. In the context of an exchange economy with a production sector, several results are obtained about equilibria mergings and about welfare comparisons.
Classification-JEL
Mot(s) clé(s)
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2006-3 "A note on price-taking and price-making behaviours in pure exchange economies"

Ludovic A. Julien, Fabrice Tricou

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Abstract
This paper explores the rationale of price-taking and price-making behaviours in the context of Walrasian and Cournotian pure exchange economies. Beside the influence of the number of agents, we underline the role of the structure of preferences in the definition and in the working of market power. Through three equilibrium variations of the same basic economy, we obtain several results about price manipulation, about asymptotic identifications for large economies and for degenerate preferences, and about welfare comparisons. Perfect competition does not only correspond to the case of large economies, but may also concern economies where fundamental market powers are more or less equivalent.
Classification-JEL
D43, D51
Mot(s) clé(s)
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