MOHAMED MEHDI AÏT-HAMLAT

The crime-terrorism nexus and population involvement. A theoretical analysis.

Mohamed Mehdi Aït-Hamlat, Saïd Souam

Abstract

This article investigates the multifaceted interplay between crime and terrorism through a game-theoretic framework encompassing three key actors: a Government, a Terrorist Group, and a Population. By modeling how each player allocates resources between terrorism, criminal activities, counterterrorism, and anti-crime efforts, we explain the strategic dependencies that shape policy and group behavior. A distinctive aspect of our analysis is the population’s capacity to support the government’s action, effectively substituting for part of the state’s counterterrorism resources under certain conditions. We show that a terrorist group faced with profitable criminal opportunities may shift efforts away from terrorist violence, although this redirection depends critically on the government’s resource allocation and the population’s perceived threat. Comparative statics illustrate how changes in parameters such as costs of crime or terrorism, public attitudes toward violence, and government budgets influence equilibrium outcomes. We show that increased government attention to one threat (terrorism or crime) can inadvertently strengthen the other, underscoring the importance of balanced policy measures. Our findings shed new light on the symbiotic relationship between terrorist and criminal activities, providing insights into how coordinated policy interventions, spanning law enforcement, socio-economic development, and public outreach could more effectively disrupt the crime-terror nexus.

Mot(s) clé(s)

Terrorism, organized crime, crime-terror nexus, public policies, game theory