Ludovic A. Julien, Olivier Musy, Aurélien Saïdi
- Abstract
- In this note, we consider a generalized T−stage Stackelberg oligopoly. We provide
a proof and an interpretation that under the two necessary and sufficient conditions
of linear aggregate demand and identical constant marginal costs, followers
do not matter for leaders. Leaders act as rational myopic agents, voluntarily ignoring
the number of followers and remaining stages, thereby behaving as Cournotian
oligopolists. Strategies of incumbent firms are invariant to entry of new cohorts.
Their profits can be studied by the way of two discount factors: the first impacting
markup and the second impacting output supply. Some implications in terms of
welfare and convergence toward competitive equilibrium are derived.
- Mot(s) clé(s)
- Leader’s markup discount factor; linear economy; follower’s output discount factor; myopic behavior