JEAN-MARC ZOGHEIB
Maître de conférences
2023-34
Competition, Privacy, and Multi-Homing
Jean-Marc Zogheib
- Abstract
- Two digital firms compete in prices and information disclosure levels. A consumer signing up to one firm's service decides how much personal information to provide. We find that firms essentially trade-off between consumer valuations and disclosure levels to determine their business strategies when consumers single-home. Under multi-homing, business strategies are more complex to assess and may completely shift compared to single-homing. All things being equal, implementing a strict privacy regime with no data disclosure can be optimal under single-homing, while a soft privacy regime with data disclosure may be preferred under multi-homing.
- Mot(s) clé(s)
- competition, online privacy, information disclosure, multi-homing.
2021-15
Privacy, Competition, and Multi-Homing
Marc Bourreau, Jean-Marc Zogheib
- Abstract
- Two firms compete in prices and information disclosure levels. Firms derive revenues from two possible channels, i.e., by selling their service to consumers and by exploiting user data, sold to a monopoly data broker. A consumer signing up to one firm's service decides on the amount of personal information to provide. In a single-homing framework, firms engage in either a strict privacy regime with no information disclosure and high prices or a flexible privacy regime with positive disclosure levels and low prices, depending on consumer valuations. With the possibility of multi-homing, firms face issues in the monetization of multi-homing user data, which affects privacy regimes. On top of consumer valuations, the incentives to multi-home and product differentiation also impact firms' strategies. Firms may even end up engaging in a zero-privacy regime with maximal disclosure levels if monetization issues on multi-homing user data are not too significant.
- Mot(s) clé(s)
- competition, online privacy, information disclosure, multi-homing.
2021-4
Public vs. Private Investments In Network Industries
Marc Bourreau, Jean-Marc Zogheib
- Abstract
- We study the competition between a private firm and public firms on prices and
investment in new infrastructures. While the private firm maximizes its profits,
public firms maximize the sum of their profits and consumer surplus, subject to a
budget constraint. We consider two scenarios of public intervention, with a national
public firm and with local public firms. In a monopoly benchmark, we find that the
national public firm has the highest coverage and charges a uniform price allowing
cross-subsidies between high-cost and low-cost areas. Moreover, the private firm
covers as much as local public firms. In a mixed duopoly, a stronger competitive
pressure drives firms' prices up while it drives down (up) the national public (private)
firm's coverage. - Mot(s) clé(s)
- public firms, investment, network industries, mixed duopoly.
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