Webinar TELE – Theoretical European Law & Economics
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The new Webinar TELE –Theoretical European Law & Economics, https://sites.google.com/view/webinartele/welcoming-page, is dedicated to the presentation of theoretical papers in any field of Law and Economics. This webinar will be held by Zoom (one talk per slot). The speaker will have 45/50 minutes for the presentation and there will be 30/25 minutes for questions and comments. The Webinar TELE is co-organized by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (U Amsterdam), Luigi Franzoni (U Bologna), Tim Friehe (U Marburg), Fernando Gómez (U Pompeu Fabra), Henrik Lando (Copenhagen Business School), Eric Langlais (U Paris Nanterre), Avraham Tabbach (U Tel Aviv). Due to limited space, registering is mandatory. In order to receive Zoom credentials, please write asap to eric.langlais@parisnanterre.fr.
Program

Upcoming seminars

date_range 08 DECEMBER 2026

Contract Law for Disagreeing Parties

Speaker(s)

Luigi Alberto Franzoni (University of Bologna, Italy)

Practical information

3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)

Additional information

co-authored with Roy Baharad.

Abstract: Contracts are commonly understood as promises to perform, yet such promises are made in an uncertain world where external circumstances may render performance excessively costly and lead to breach. This paper studies optimal damages when contracting parties disagree about the likelihood of such circumstances. For example, a seller may view the risk of a supply-chain disruption as remote, whereas the buyer may regard it as substantial. We show that when parties disagree about the probability of performance, optimal damages deviate from expectation damages. Damages should exceed expectation damages when the buyer is relatively pessimistic about performance (her beliefs about performance costs first-order stochastically dominate the seller’s), and fall below expectation damages in the opposite case. We study two sources of relative pessimism: heterogeneous beliefs (non-common priors) and ambiguity aversion under shared but uncertain probabilities. The analysis extends to renegotiation and reliance and bears on contract doctrines such as liquidated damages, mistake, misrepresentation, and excuse.

date_range 09 MARCH 2027

State Capacity, Access to Justice, and the Design of Domestic-Violence Enforcement

Speaker(s)

Brishti Guha (Jawaharlal Nehru University, India)

Practical information

3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)

Additional information

co-authored with Parimal Bag (National University of Singapore).
Abstract: Domestic-violence enforcement in developing countries must balance access to justice against limited investigative capacity. We develop a model in which victims choose whether and how to report violence, some complainants have an incentive to strategically misreport, and courts receive imperfect signals of guilt. We compare mandatory arrest laws, under which every complaint reaches the court, with warrant-based screening, under which a costly police investigation filters complaints before adjudication. Screening reduces strategic misreporting and makes severe violence easier to deter, because the probability that an investigation yields incriminating evidence rises disproportionately with the intensity of violence. Mandatory arrest, however, avoids the screening stage and so can improve access to justice for low-intensity violence, at the cost of admitting more unsubstantiated complaints and weakening the deterrence of severe violence.
We show that an unconstrained planner does better under arrest with warrants. She prefers graduated penalties under mandatory arrest, but a flat penalty under warrant-based screening. Then we characterize how binding statutory maxima constrain deterrence differently under the two regimes. Finally, we use institutional and administrative evidence from India, where the standard for arrest in domestic-violence complaints changed in 2017, to describe the empirical relevance of the mechanisms.

date_range 08 JUNE 2027

The Alarmist's Dilemma

Speaker(s)

Abraham Wickelgren (University of Texas at Austin, USA)

Practical information

3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)

Additional information

co-authored with Frances Xu Lee (Loyola University Chicago, USA), and Shmuel Leshem.
Abstract: We study situations where a single alarm suffices to avert harm, yet sounding a single false alarm is individually costly. Each of n players receives a private binary signal about the state of the world (safe or dangerous) and must independently decide whether to sound the alarm (act). Because individual action is payoff-relevant only if all others refrain from acting, players rationally discount a danger signal. These pivotality inferences intensify with group size and the relative cost of inaction to action. Higher-quality information can counterintuitively reduce incentives to act. Relative to a single player, larger groups never reduce, but may increase, both error rates. Our model provides a unified explanation for puzzling collective inaction in emergency response (the murder of Kitty Genovese), organizational reporting (whistle-blowing), and intelligence alarm (Pearl Harbor, October 7).

Archive

Past seminars

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