Photo Marc Baudry

Marc Baudry

Professeur(e)
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  • Tél. professionnel 0140977815
  • Bureau à Paris Nanterre (Bât. + num.) G313G
  • Axe de recherche

      Développement Durable, Environnement et Energie

  • Thème(s)
    • Economie de l'environnement et des ressources naturelles
    • Economie de l'innovation, du changement technologique et de la propriété intellectuelle
    • Econométrie appliquée
    • Microéconomie appliquée

2020-19 "Emissions Trading with Transaction Costs"

Marc Baudry, Anouk Faure, Simon Quemin

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Résumé
Nous développons un modèle d'équilibre de marché de droits à polluer en présence de coûts de transaction fixes et proportionnels, où le prix du permis et la participation des firmes sont déterminés de façon endogène. Nous analysons ensuite la sensibilité de l'équilibre à un changement du niveau des coûts de transaction et de l'allocation gratuite des firmes, et caractérisons les situations où ces derniers ont un effet baissier ou haussier sur le prix du permis par comparaison au cas concurrentiel. Enfin, nous calibrons le modèle sur les données annuelles de transaction et conformité du registre du SEQE durant sa deuxième phase (2008-12), que nous consolidons à l'échelle de la firme.
Nous trouvons que des coûts de transaction de l'ordre de 10k€ par an plus 1€ par permis échangé réduisent substantiellement les divergences entre observations et prédictions théoriques du comportement des firmes (conformité passive par exemple). Nos simulations suggèrent qu'ignorer les coûts de transaction peuvent mener à sous-estimer l'impact des politiques de gestion de l'offre sur les prix de marché, de façon différenciée selon leur incidence sur les firmes.
Classification-JEL
D22, D23, H32, L22, Q52, Q58
Mot(s) clé(s)
Marché de permis, Coûts de transaction, Conception et évaluation de politiques publiques, SEQE
Fichier

2018-47 "The Fate of Inventions. What can we learn from Bayesian learning in strategic options model of adoption ?"

Marc Baudry, Edouard Civel

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Résumé
Nous développons un jeu où des agents hétérogènes ont la possibilité soit d'adopter une invention de qualité incertaine, soit de différer leur décision afin de bénéficier de l'expérience des adoptants à travers un apprentissage bayésien. Les messages produits sur la nature de l'invention sont bruyants, représentant le problème "d'essuyer les plâtres" lors de l'adoption d'un nouveau produit ou service. Notre modèle donne des fondements microéconomiques aux courbes de diffusion de l'innovation en forme de S, l'externalité informationnelle induisant un retard stratégique dans le comportement des agents. De plus, nous montrons que le bruit pourrait tuer dans l'œuf de bonnnes inventions: les simulations numériques soulignent une distribution bimodale des états stationnaires pour la diffusion de l'innovation, morte-née ou pleinement développée, mettant en lumière le risque létal de réputation pour les inventions.
Classification-JEL
O33 ; L15 ; D83 ; C73.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Diffusion de l'innovation ; Adoption des inventions ; Information ; Options Stratégiques ; Apprentissage bayésien.
Fichier

2016-7 "The Private Value of Plant Variety Protection and the Impact of Exemption Rules"

Marc Baudry, Adrien Hervouet

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Résumé
Plant Breeders Rights (PBRs) are sui generis IPRs intended to promote plant variety creation. Two characteristics distinguish PBRs from patents: the research and the farmers’ exemptions. This article attempts to assess the impact of these exemption rules on the private value of PBRs. For this purpose, a microeconometric model of PBRs renewals is developed and estimated. This model extends previous models of patents renewals by allowing the use of PBRs-specific variables. It is argued that simple tests on the coefficients associated to key PBRs-specific variables can provide insights into the impact of the two exemption rules. Implementation to PBRs in France over the period 1973-2011 for six major crops suggests that neither the farmers’ exemption nor the research exemption have a clear cut effect on the private value of PBRs. We conclude that there is no evidence to argue in favor of a reform of PBRs.
Classification-JEL
O34, Q16, C41.
Mot(s) clé(s)
IPRs, Inventors’ exemption, Farmers’ exemption, Plant variety creation, Renewals.
Fichier

2015-18 "Market pull instruments and the development of wind power in Europe: a counterfactual analysis"

Marc Baudry, Clément Bonnet

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Résumé
Renewable energy technologies are called to play a crucial role in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Since most of these technologies are immature, public policies provide for two types of support: technology push and market pull. The latter aims at creating demand for new technologies and at stimulating their diffusion. Nevertheless, due to the complex self-sustained dynamics of diffusion it is hard to determine whether newly installed capacities are imputable to the impulse effect of instruments at the beginning of the diffusion process or to the current support. The paper addresses this problem. A micro-founded model of technology diffusion is built to estimate the impact of the yearly average Return-on-Investment (RoI) on the yearly count of commissioned wind farms in six European countries over the last decade. A counter-factual analysis is carried out to assess the impact of policy instruments on the RoI and, indirectly, on diffusion.
Classification-JEL
O33, Q42, Q55, H23, C61.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Renewable energy; technology diffusion; wind power; market pull; technology push.
Fichier

2014-32 "Promoting innovation on the seed market and biodiversity: the role of IPRs and commercialisation rules"

Marc Baudry, Adrien Hervouet

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Résumé
This article deals with the impact of legislation in the seed sector on incentives for variety creation. Two categories of rules interact. The first category consists in intellectual property rights and is intended to address a problem of sequential innovation and R&D investments by the private sector. The second category concerns commercial rules that are intended to correct a problem of adverse selection on the seed market. We propose a dynamic model of market equilibrium with vertical product differentiation that enables us to take into account the economic consequences of imposing either Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) or patents as IPRs. We simultaneously examine two kinds of commercial legislation: compulsory registration in a catalogue and minimum standards for commercialisation. Analytical results are completed by numerical simulations. The main result is that the combination between minimum standards and PBRs provides higher incentives for sequential innovation and may be preferred by a public regulator to maximise the expected and discounted total surplus when sunk investment costs are low or when they are medium and the probability of R&D success is sufficiently high. This solution differs from the combination of IPRs and commercialisation rules used in both the US and Europe. Otherwise, PBRs have to be replaced by patents, which yields a configuration close to that observed in the US. The catalogue commercialisation rule is seldom preferred to minimum standards, so that the combination of IPRs and commercialisation rules that prevails in Europe is not supported by our model.
Classification-JEL
D43, D82, K11, L13, Q12.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Intellectual Property Rights, Plant Breeders’ Rights, Catalogue, Product differentiation, Asymmetric information, Biodiversity.
Fichier

2012-45 "Revisiting the hedonic price method to assess the implicit price of environmental quality with market segmentation"

Marc Baudry, Masha Maslianskaïa-Pautrel

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Résumé
The article highlights the role of heterogeneity in the formation of hedonic prices. The article distinguishes between continuous and groupwise heterogeneity. The distinction helps understanding two important points. First, the analysis of market equilibrium with groupwise heterogeneity makes explicit the role of participation and incentives compatibility constraints for groups of buyers. The case of continuous heterogeneity may be thought of as a limit case of groupwise heterogeneity when the number of groups goes to infinity and their masses go to zero. The hedonic price curve is then obtained as the solution of a differential equation resulting from a market clearing condition. Second, the article outlines that submarkets emerge from market equilibrium only in the case of groupwise heterogeneity. The existence of submarkets means that the hedonic price function is continuous but the implicit price of characteristics is discontinuous at endogenous threshold values separating submarkets. Major implications for the valuation of environmental quality follow on. Based on numerical simulations, the article gives some insights into the way significant biases and drawbacks in the estimation of the implicit price of environmental quality can arise if the usual two steps procedure is implemented.
Classification-JEL
R21, R31, Q51
Mot(s) clé(s)
Environmental valuation, discrete heterogeneity, hedonicmodeling, vertical differentiation
Fichier

2012-31 "Valuing patents using renewal data: an inquiry into the feasability of an automated patent scoring method"

Marc Baudry, Béatrice Dumont

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Résumé
In this paper, we address the problem of patent valuation. With this aim in view, we focus on the feasibility of a patent rating system. This leads us to develop a structural model of patent renewal decisions based on real options that links patent renewals and patent value and to estimate it on micro level data. Results for a sample of European patents show that unobserved heterogeneity is too high to efficiently discriminate among patents and cast some doubt on the possibility to develop a reliable rating system based only on patent metrics.
Classification-JEL
Mot(s) clé(s)
Fichier
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