Photo Sophie Harnay

Sophie Harnay

Professeur(e)
  • Email
  • Tél. professionnel 0140977785
  • Bureau à Paris Nanterre (Bât. + num.) G607B
  • Axe de recherche

      Macroéconomie Internationale, Banque et Econométrie Financière

  • Thème(s)
    • Economie institutionnaliste
    • Economie des institutions
    • Analyse économique des régulations marchandes ou non marchandes
    • Economie des professions

2017-34 "Obeying vs. resisting unfair laws. A structural analysis of the internalization of collective preferences on redistribution using classification trees and random forests"

Sophie Harnay, Élisabeth Tovar

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Résumé
In this paper, we study whether individual normative preferences are affected by the knowledge of collective normative preferences. In a questionnaire-experimental framework, we study whether respondents obey, resist or are indifferent to a very unfair but legal distribution of an inheritance between a minimum wage-earner and a millionaire. In addition to regressions, we use classification trees and random forests to provide a full picture of how asymmetric combinations of self-interest and ideological factors may lead to identical individual redistributive preferences and law internalization attitudes. We find that sensitivity to procedural fairness and responsibility cut opinions are good predictors of individual redistributive preferences. We also find that law internalization is associated with the support of core normative values, but not with the support of fairness as procedures. This echoes Cooter’s hypothesis of ‘meta preferences’ triggering an expressive vs. backlash effects of laws. Lastly, we find that, among the law-sensitive, the social ‘losers’ tend to submit to the unfair but legal collective preference while the social ‘winners’ tend to either be indifferent of voice their disagreement.
Classification-JEL
C45, C88, D63, H30, K10, Z13.
Mot(s) clé(s)
redistribution, law expressivity, self-interest, ideology, classification trees, random forests.
Fichier

2011-32 "Reputation on a credence good market: an economic analysis of professional self-regulation"

Camille Chaserant, Sophie Harnay

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Résumé
This article provides a rationalization of (at least partial) professional self-regulation resting on the joint production of individual and collective reputations and its impact on the quality of professional services. It presents a short model that aims to show that (i) a high-quality steady-state exists in a market for a credence goods and that (ii) the likelihood of high quality increases when the market is self-regulated by the profession in comparison to the situation where there is no self-regulation. The law and economics literature usually criticizes self-regulation as a modern form of corporatism; we show that it may help to regulate quality when clients are faced with opportunistic professionals.
Classification-JEL
K4, L14, L15, L43, L84, D8
Mot(s) clé(s)
professional services, credence goods, self-regulation, individual reputation, collective reputation
Fichier

2010-9 "Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique"

Camille Chaserant, Sophie Harnay

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Résumé
Cet article présente, de manière critique, les analyses économiques de la réglementation de la profession d’avocat s’inscrivant dans le débat, plus large, sur la libéralisation des professions réglementées en Europe. Issues de l’économie publique et de l’économie industrielle les plus standards, ces analyses s’avèrent datées. Elles n’apportent alors aucune originalité par rapport aux travaux sur la déréglementation des marchés des biens plus traditionnels et s’avèrent sans portée pratique réelle. Elles conduisent à des recommandations théoriques antithétiques que le recours à l’empirie ne permet pas, à l’heure actuelle, de départager. Surtout, l’accent exclusif sur l’alternative déréglementer / maintenir la réglementation occulte la question préalable de l’identité de l’autorité en charge de la réglementation : la profession doit-elle être auto- ou hétéro-régulée ?
Classification-JEL
Mot(s) clé(s)
réglementation, profession, bien de confiance, asymétries d’information, auto-régulation
Fichier
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