Photo Laurence Scialom

Laurence Scialom

Professeur(e)
  • Email
  • Tél. professionnel 0140977785
  • Bureau à Paris Nanterre (Bât. + num.) G607B
  • Axe de recherche

      Macroéconomie Internationale, Banque et Econométrie Financière

  • Thème(s)
    • Economie bancaire
    • Crise financière
    • Régulation prudentielle
    • Banque centrale

2014-39 "Banking Union: Time Is Not On Our Side"

Adrien Béranger, Jézabel Couppey Soubeyran, Laurence Scialom

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Résumé
This paper reviews the various mechanisms and rules that has been proposed to build a banking union in Europe. We argue that the banking union is a promising solution to the Eurozone crisis because it completes the unification of the Euro currency, forms a solution to both the financial and monetary fragmentation of the Euro area financial markets and helps breaking the vicious circle created by domestic banking system impairments and the sovereign debt crisis. We underline not only the shortcomings and hurdles to reach a fully-fledged banking union, and the hazards created by the inconsistencies between their phasing-in in the sequential schedule decided by states. To reduce the loopholes induced by the sequential approach, we propose to implement a rule of shared-bailout during the transition period that consist in a loss-sharing rule among countries hosting an entity of a bank group and indicted in the living wills of the systemic banking companies
Classification-JEL
G21, G28, H12, E58
Mot(s) clé(s)
Eurozone, banking union, bank supervision, resolution
Fichier

2009-29 "A systemic approach to financial regulation: a European perspective"

Michel Aglietta, Laurence Scialom

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Résumé
The global financial crisis has pinpointed the relevance and the virulence of systemic risk in modern innovative finance. It is grounded in the propensity of credit markets to drift to extremes in close correlation with asset price spikes and slumps. In turn, such a propensity is nurtured by the heuristic behaviour of market participants under severe uncertainty. While plagued by disaster myopia, market participants spread systemic risk. Such adverse conditions have been magnified by financial innovations that have made finance predatory and capable of capturing regulators to annihilate prudential policies. Malfunctioning in finance is so deep and disorders are so widespread that sweeping reforms are the order of the day, if financial stability is viewed as a primary public concern. In this paper we argue that macro prudential policy should be the linchpin of relevant reforms. Being a top-down approach, it impinges both upon monetary policy and micro prudential policy. Central banks should pursue a dual objective of price and financial stability. Bank supervisors should broaden their oversight on a much larger perimeter, encompassing all systematically important institutions. Counter cyclical capital provisions should be required and linked to the control of aggregate credit supply. Leveraged institutions without deposit base should be subject to incentives for a much stricter liquidity management. To stem regulatory capture, prompt corrective action should be enlarged in its scope and adapted to mark-to-market financial intermediaries. Implementing macro prudential policy entails institutional changes. Central banks, bank supervisors and other financial regulators need to work much closer than beforehand, because the spread of systemic risk is not deterred by institutional and geographical frontiers. The changes to make are particularly stringent in Europe, where national parochialism makes the resolution of orderly cross-border bank crisis all but impossible.
Classification-JEL
Mot(s) clé(s)
Fichier

2008-23 "Northern Rock: The anatomy of a crisis – the prudential lessons"

Sonia Ondo-Ndong, Laurence Scialom

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Résumé
This paper attempts to analyse the main characteristics of the Northern Rock crisis and the responses of the Bank of England as lender of last resort. On the basis of the diagnosis about the causes and the handling of this banking crisis we detect the shortcomings prevailing in the UK prudential device. We therefore try to draw the prudential lessons of this experience. As we cannot claim to present an exhaustive picture of the crisis's implications from a prudential point of view, we chose to focus instead on the points with practical significance far beyond the UK's case.
Classification-JEL
G38, G33, G32 et G28
Mot(s) clé(s)
bank bankruptcy, deposit insurance, liquidity regulation
Fichier

2008-21 "Permanence and innovation in central banking policy for financial stability"

Michel Aglietta, Laurence Scialom

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Résumé
In the first part of this paperer, we emphasize the adaptability and continuity of the lender-of-last-resort doctrine beyond the diversity of financial structures from the 19th century to the present day.. The second part deals with the global credit crisis and the analysis of the central banks' innovative practices during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We highlight that the lender of last resort's role is not confined to providing emergency liquidity. It aims to provide orderly deleveraging in the financial system in order to preserve the financial intermediation process. Our conclusion underlines that the crisis management has become global and strategic. It opens the way to a major regulatory and supervisory reform.
Classification-JEL
E58, G12, G18, G21
Mot(s) clé(s)
lender of last resort, central banking, liquidity crisis
Fichier
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