2016-36 "The falling sperm counts story": A limit to growth?"
Johanna Etner, Natacha Raffin, Thomas Seegmuller
Voir
Télécharger le document de travail (via EconPapers)
- Résumé
- We develop an overlapping generations model of growth, in which agents differ through their ability to procreate. Based on epidemiological evidence, we assume that pollution is a cause of this health heterogeneity, affecting sperm quality. Nevertheless, agents with impaired fertility may incur health treatments in order to increase their chances of parenthood. In this set-up, we analyse the dynamic behaviour of the economy and characterise the situation reached in the long run. Then, we determine the optimal solution that prevails when a social planner maximises a Millian utilitarian criterion and propose a set of available economic instruments to decentralise the optimal solution. We underscore that to correct for both the externalities of pollution and the induced-health inefficiency, it is necessary to tax physical capital while it requires to overall subsidy mostly harmed agents within the economy. Hence, we argue that fighting against the sources of an altered reproductive health is more relevant than directly inciting agents to incur health treatments.
- Classification-JEL
- O44; Q56; I18.
- Mot(s) clé(s)
- Pollution; Growth; Fertility; Health.
- Fichier
-
|
2013-30 "Illiquid Life Annuities"
Johanna Etner, Hippolyte d'ALBIS
Voir
Télécharger le document de travail (via EconPapers)
- Résumé
- In this article, we consider illiquid life annuity contracts and show that they may be preferred to Yaari (1965)'s liquid contracts. In an overlapping-generation economy, liquid life annuities are demanded only if the equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. Alternatively, an equilibrium displaying a positive demand for illiquid life annuities is efficient. In this latter case, the welfare at steady-state is larger if illiquid life annuity contracts are available.
- Classification-JEL
- E21, D11
- Mot(s) clé(s)
- annuity, overlapping generation model
- Fichier
-
|
2012-33 "Underestimation of probability modifications: characterization and economic implications"
Johanna Etner, Meglena Jeleva
Voir
Télécharger le document de travail (via EconPapers)
- Résumé
- The aim of this paper is to propose a behavioral characterization of individuals who underestimate probability modifications and to characterize this behavior in the standard preferences representation models under risk (Expected utility, Dual theory, Rank Dependant Utility Theory and MaxMin Expected Utility). Our main results are the following. Underreaction to probability modifications is in general independent from standard risk aversion and prudence. In models involving probability transformation functions, it is characterized by the slope of the probability transformation function. In the MaxMin Expected utility model under risk, it is related to the weights of the maximal and minimal consequences in the preferences representation function. Considering a simple prevention decision, consisting in the reduction of the probability of a monetary loss, we show that individuals who underreact to probability modifications invest less in prevention than individuals who objectively evaluate these modifications. Underreaction to probability modification is thus a possible explanation for low investment in prevention.
- Classification-JEL
- D81
- Mot(s) clé(s)
- probability perception; non expected utility; prevention
- Fichier
-
|
2008-25 "Bankable Pollution Permits under Uncertainty and Optimal Risk Management Rules: Theory and Empirical Evidence"
Julien Chevallier, Johanna Etner, Pierre-André Jouvet
Voir
Télécharger le document de travail (via EconPapers)
- Résumé
- The well known economic advantage of tradable permits over command
and control obviously vanishes if firms do not trade because of regulatory
uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty about political decision changes in the permits
program could make firms reluctant to participate in tradable permits
markets. Based on a two-period partial equilibrium framework, our results
suggest that the banking provisions may be used as a tool of policy risk control
and that it is possible to define optimal risk sharing rules in order to
respond to political decision changes. Finally, our empirical discussion attempts
to put the theoretical results concerning firms' banking and pooling
behaviors in the context of the recent development of the European Union
Emisions Trading scheme (EU ETS).
- Classification-JEL
- D21, D80, Q58
- Mot(s) clé(s)
- Firm behavior; Tradable permits; Policy risk; EU ETS
- Fichier
-
|
2006-7 "Stockage des permis de pollution en incertitude et règle de partage optimal de risques"
Johanna Etner, Pierre-André Jouvet
Voir
Télécharger le document de travail (via EconPapers)
- Résumé
- Les permis de pollution sont porteurs d'incertitude à la fois sur leur prix futur mais également sur les décisions politiques aussi bien en terme de règles d'allocation entre les firmes qu'en terme de dotations globales. Ces incertitudes politiques peuvent conduire à une certaine réticence des firmes à s'engager en faveur de ce mode de régulation. Nous proposons d'établir des règles de partages optimales des risques afin de palier aux incertitudes politiques et nous montrons comment l'autorisation de stockage de permis par les firmes peut compenser ces risques.
- Classification-JEL
- D21, D80, Q58
- Mot(s) clé(s)
- comportement des firmes,permis de pollution,incertitude politique
- Fichier
-
|
Veuillez patienter ...
