With Ester Manna & Shubranshu Singh
Abstract : Generative AI systems often suffer from AI hallucinations in that they may provide confident responses unjustified by their training data. Given the increasing reliance on generative AI systems, it is hard to overstate the perils of AI hallucinations. In this paper, we explore the question of whether AI developers or human decision makers should be liable for the harm the AI systems may cause. We develop a novel theoretical framework to study and compare implications of liability for developers of AI systems versus liability for human decision makers. We find that in some cases AI developer liability can interestingly result in over-supervision and under-adoption by the human decision makers. Although AI operator liability leads to efficient accuracy investment when AI accuracy is publicly observed, developer liability results in higher accuracy investment when it is privately observed by the developer. We show that the optimal allocation of liability may change over time, depending on the evolution of the technology.
Abstract: We examine national security policies implemented by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and how they affect corporate investment. CFIUS can deny regulatory approval of foreign takeovers on national security grounds. We document a sharp increase in CFIUS denials of regulatory approval during the 2008-2019 sample period in which the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) was in place. CFIUS denials are followed by a negative market reaction, a decrease in foreign takeovers, and a reduction in corporate investment in industries of the blocked-acquisition targets. The decreases in corporate investment are more pronounced among firms that are ex-ante financially constrained. Our results may be of interest to regulators who have recently adopted CFIUS-like mechanisms to protect critical assets from foreign hands.
with Sergei Guriev, Emeric Henry, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
Co-écrit avec Matthieu Belarouci & Vincent Lenglin
Abstract :We experimentally study conciliation, an intervention aimed at improving bargaining efficiency. In conciliation, a neutral third party collaborates with the parties by suggesting resolutions to promote agreements. Unlike delegation or arbitration, conciliation fully preserves the autonomy of the parties. Unlike mediation, the conciliator cannot filter information. Whether conciliation can improve bargaining efficiency is an open question. In our laboratory experiment, two "litigants" bargain over the split of a loss in an unstructured protocol. In case of failure, a random split is implemented. In some conditions, a third party, the conciliator takes part in the bargaining by submitting non-binding suggestions to the litigants. We find that, on average, conciliation does not affect the likelihood of failure or the splits that are agreed upon by litigants. However, for bargaining pairs composed of selfish litigants, conciliation leads to more equal agreements. Conciliation also reduces bargaining delays: the time and the number of offers necessary to converge to an agreement are significantly reduced in the presence of a conciliator.
with M. Rosholm & M. Simonsen
Avec Christian Peukert
Abstract : This paper provides a theoretical framework to consider the effects of profit-driven media as an information provider about criminal issues on criminal behaviors and avoidance behaviors of victims. Then, we show that profit-driven news media reporting can be biased and over-misrepresented about criminal situations. This leads to an increased demand for crime news reporting of offenders and victims and causes inefficient behaviors compared to the social welfare perspective. This kind of distortion can be happened by the informal sanction provided by the profit-driven media. These help us to discuss direct and indirect interactions between criminal policies and intervention for media industries.
Co-auteur: M. Schwarz
[Papier]
Avec A. Fogli
Abstract: We study the impact of internal migration on the U.S. fertility transition in the Nineteenth century. We show that fertility declined faster in counties characterized by a higher outward migration, especially towards the Western frontier. We exploit the number of acres granted to veterans of the American wars to estimate the causal effect of migration on fertility decline. Our theory is based on the diffusion of new family values governing intergenerational behavior with respect to saving and fertility. Migration and the lack of remittance technology lowered expected transfers from children, and incentivized precautionary savings of parents. Results are robust to several measures of fertility and internal migration.
[Papier]
Co-auteure: Johannes Loh
[Papier]
Co-auteur: E. Ash
Co-auteurs: Simon Briole et Laura Khoury
[Papier]
Article à l'appui de la présentation : lien
Avec Grazia Cecere and Sarah Lemaire
co-auteur: Patrick Legros
co-auteur: B. De los Santos
coécrit avec M. Ayouni
co-écrit avec Ph. Mongin
co-écrit avec C. Desrieux
co-écrit avec Renato Gomes
Veuillez patienter ...
