The new Webinar TELE –Theoretical European Law & Economics is dedicated to the presentation of theoretical papers in any field of Law and Economics. This webinar will be held by Zoom (one talk per slot). The speaker will have 45/50 minutes for the presentation and there will be 30/25 minutes for questions and comments. The Webinar TELE is co-organized by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (U Amsterdam), Luigi Franzoni (U Bologna), Tim Friehe (U Marburg), Fernando Gómez (U Pompeu Fabra), Henrik Lando (Copenhagen Business School), Eric Langlais (U Paris Nanterre), Avraham Tabbach (U Tel Aviv). Due to limited space, registering is mandatory. In order to receive Zoom credentials, please write asap to eric.langlais@parisnanterre.fr.


3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Shay Lavie (Tel Aviv University, Israel) : Bargaining with the judge to facilitate settlements

co-authored with Avraham Tabbach (Tel Aviv University, Israel)
Abstract : In various legal scenarios, litigants often seek court approval for settlements that are questionable, yet mutually advantageous for the parties. Examples abound: in class actions, settling parties frequently seek excessive attorneys' fees; in plea-bargains, a lenient sentence is often pursued; in tort cases, parties seek the sealing of settlements, and so forth. This paper explores the dynamics of this "bargain" between litigants and judges, in the presence of asymmetric information. On one hand, judges approving requested benefits may facilitate settlements, but on the other hand, such approvals can foster further demands. Our analysis reveals that while granting these benefits may lead to a substantial reduction in trial rates, judges should generally deny such requests (unless they are not aligned with the interests of the judiciary). Further, we propose practical mechanisms that capitalize on this dynamic to incentivize truthful benefit demands and facilitate settlements that judges could approve.

3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time)
Joshua Teitelbaum (Georgetown University, Washington, USA) : The Law of General Average

Abstract : Part of a ship's cargo is jettisoned in order to save the vessel and the remaining cargo from imminent peril. How should the loss be shared among the cargo owners? The law of general average, an ancient principle of maritime law, prescribes that the owners share the loss proportionally according to the respective values of their cargo. We analyze whether the law of general average is a truthful and efficient mechanism. That is, we investigate whether it induces truthful reporting of cargo values and yields a Pareto efficient allocation in equilibrium. We show that the law of general average is neither truthful nor efficient if owners have expected utility preferences, but is both truthful and efficient if owners have maxmin utility preferences. We discuss why the maxmin criterion may be reasonable under the circumstances.


MARDI 11 JUIN 2024
(3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time))
Frances Xu Lee (Loyola University Chicago, USA) : Paid Testimony with a Chance of Perjury.

Abstract : A jury is informed of the amount of leniency or concession promised to an eyewitness for testifying against a defendant, which provides information on the credibility of the testimony. This paper shows that a higher concession amount reduces the credibility even though a higher concession attracts honest testimonies as well as perjuries. When making an offer to a potential eyewitness, a prosecutor therefore faces the trade-off that a higher amount of concession produces more testimonies (both truth and perjury), but reduces the testimonies' credibility. By endogenizing the payment for testimony, this paper shows that an increase in the probability of detecting perjury or in the perjury sanction may increase the incentive to purchase testimonies and have the unintended consequences of increasing the chance of perjury and increasing the chance of wrongly convicting a defendant. A court that cares about the Type 1 and Type 2 errors should adjust the standard of the proof higher when the prosecutor can pay for testimonies. Under the optimal standard of proof, the court benefits from a higher probability of perjury detection.

MARDI 05 MARS 2024
(3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time))
Ester Manna (University of Barcelona, Spain) : Platform Liability with Reputational Sanctions

co-authored with Alessandro De Chiara (University of Barcelona, Spain), Juan José Ganuza (University Pompeu Fabra), Fernando Gómez (University Pompeu Fabra) and Adrian Segura (University Pompeu Fabra).

Abstract. This paper presents a framework where sellers, an online platform with monopoly power, and consumers transact. We aim to study the interaction between the imposition of liability on the platform, the reputational sanctions exerted by consumers, and the internal measures adopted by the platform to keep in check the sellers, whenever a product generates losses to consumers. We show that introducing direct legal liability of the platform may have both positive and negative effects for safety investments. Additionally, when sellers are heterogeneous (with respect to their sensitivity to the sanctions from consumers or from the platform), legal liability on the platform will have an impact on the selection of participating sellers, although the sign and size of the effect largely depend on parameter values.

(3:00 pm to 4:15 pm (Paris time))
Ryan Bubb (NYU School of Law) : Differentiation through Legal Uncertainty

co-authored with Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Law)

Abstract: We show how legal uncertainty can enable simple legal standards to produce socially useful differentiation in incentives that better accommodates heterogeneity. First, legal uncertainty smooths out the discontinuities in incentives that coarse legal standards would otherwise produce. Second, individuals rationally form beliefs about legal standards in part by projecting their own circumstances. We apply our analysis to a range of issues in legal design, including the choice between rules and standards, the optimal degree of legal complexity, and the choice between “sanctions” (e.g., the negligence rule) and “prices” (e.g., strict liability).

MARDI 20 JUIN 2023
(1:30 pm to 2:45 pm (Paris time))
Henrik Lando (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark) : When should non-performance of contracts be excused under changed circumstances?
load Veuillez patienter ...